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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This section includes (A) a description of the nature of the case; (B) a history of the
proceedings; and (C) a statement of the material facts.

A. Nature of the Case
This case arises from an agreement incidental to a zone change. Bums Holdings and
Teton County entered a development agreement on August 31, 2007. The Bums Companies
alleged that Teton County breached the agreement. Teton County has opposed the allegations of
breach.

B. Course of Proceedings
This is the second action and fourth appeal arising from an August 31, 2007 development
agreement between Teton County and Bums Holdings. After entering the agreement, Bums
Holdings applied for a conditional use permit to construct a concrete batch plant. Teton County
denied the permit, and Bums Holdings sought judicial review. Burns Holdings, LLC v. Teton

County, Case No. CV-2007-376 (Idaho 7th Dist. Ct., Teton Cnty., filed Dec. 11, 2007.) In 2012,
the Idaho Supreme Court ruled in favor of Teton County, holding that Bums Holdings should
have applied for a variance, rather than a conditional use permit, to exceed the County's height
restriction.
In 2012, Bums Holdings applied for a variance. Teton County denied the application for
variance. Bums Holdings did not seek judicial review.
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In 2013, Bums Concrete and Bums Holdings sued Teton County for declaratory
judgment, breach of contract, rescission, and unjust enrichment. Teton County counterclaimed
for breach of contract and declaratory judgment. In 2015, the district court issued summary
judgment in favor of Teton County and dismissed the Bums Companies' complaint with
prejudice. As part of its judgment, the district court declared that the temporary facility violates
Teton County's zoning laws. The Bums Companies' appealed. On November 1, 2016, the Idaho
Supreme Court vacate the judgement and remand the case to the district court.
On remand, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Bums
Companies, holding that Teton County breached the development agreement, and reserving the
issue of damages for trial. A bench trial concluded on May 11, 2018. The district court issued
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on October 4, 2018, and amended Findings on January
18, 2019, awarding joint damages to the Bums Companies of $1,049,250.90. The Court entered
judgment on February 28, 2019. Teton County appealed, and the Bums Companies crossappealed. The appeal is pending.
On September 9, 2019, the district court awarded $792,529.25 in attorney's fees and
$3,886.40 in costs to the Bums Companies. In response to a motion to reconsider and amend, on
December 17, 2019, the district court increased its award of attorney fees to a total award of
$808,783.75. Teton County now appeals, and the Bums Companies cross-appeal.

C. Statement of Facts
1.

The Parties to this action are Plaintiff Bums Concrete, Inc. ("Bums Concrete"),

Plaintiff Bums Holdings, LLC ("Bums Holdings") and Defendant Teton County (the "County").
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(R., P. 20.) Bums Concrete and Bums Holdings may be referred to collectively as "Plaintiffs" or

the "Bums Companies". Plaintiffs and the County may be referred to collectively as the "Parties"
and individually as a "Party".
2.

Bums Holdings entered the Developer's Agreement for Bums Holdings, LLC,

dated August 31, 2007 (the "Agreement"). (Ex. 3.) Bums Concrete is not a party to the
Agreement and is not identified in the Agreement. (Ex. 3.)
3.

The Developer's Agreement includes an attorney fee provision, stating: "If any

party shall bring suit against the other party to enforce this agreement, the prevailing party shall
be entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs." (Dev. Agmt. ,r 12.e.)
4.

This trial of this matter concluded on May 11, 2018.

5.

On July 5, 2019, the law firm of Parsons Behle and Latimer and the Bums

Companies amended their engagement agreement. (Ex. A to K. Bums Deel. of Mar. 7, 2019.)
The amended engagement agreement provides, among other things:
All fees (but not costs) previously or subsequently billed for the Lawsuit that have
not yet been or are not hereafter, as applicable, paid within 120 days from the
respective invoices dates (of which there are currently $44,297.50 in such fees)
shall be converted to the following modified contingent-fee terms:
(a) Three times (300%) the total amount of such fees shall be payable to the Firm
out of the first dollars collected from Teton County with respect to the
Lawsuit, whether received on judgment entered against or upon settlement
with Teton County; and
(b) Payment of those fees not paid within 120 days from their respective invoice
dates is contingent upon the collection of money from Teton County with
respect to the Lawsuit, and none of such fees shall be payable by the Bums
entities other than out of any moneys collected from Teton County with
respect to the Lawsuit.
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II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

The issue Teton County presents on appeal is: Whether the district court erred in
calculating and awarding attorneys' fees.

III.

ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL

Teton County claims attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to Paragraph 12(e) of the
Developer's Agreement.

IV.

ARGUMENT

An award of attorney fees and costs under Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure
is within the discretion of the trial court and subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review.
Kenworth Sales Co. v. Skinner Trucking, Inc., 165 Idaho 938, _ 454 P.3d 580, 585 (2019). The

Idaho Supreme Court has adopted a four-part test to review abuse of discretion:
Whether the trial court (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached
its decision by the exercise of reason.
Kenworth, 454 P.3d at 580 (citing Lunnenborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856,863,421 P.3d

187, 194 (2018)).

A. The engagement agreement is unreasonable.
The Bums Companies and their law firm entered an amended engagement agreement to
compensate the law firm for past due amounts. The agreement provided that past due amounts
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could be collected from recovery at 300% the original amount. In awarding fees, the district
court characterized the engagement agreement as a "contingency arrangement". (Mem. Dec. of
Sept. 9, 2019 at p. 20.) However, Teton County maintains that it is a fixed fee with a usurious
rate of interest.
The Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit a lawyer from making an agreement
for an unreasonable fee. I.R.P.C. 1.5(a). Similarly, the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure prevent a
court from awarding an unreasonable fee. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l). A fee collected at 300% of the
regular hourly rate is unreasonable.
At common law, contingency agreements were illegal because they were considered
champerty. Robert L. Rossi, Attorneys' Fees § 2.1 (3d ed.). Lawyers were not allowed to have
any interest in the outcome of a lawsuit. Concerns with champerty are reflected in modem
regulations. For example, Rule 1.8 of the Idaho Rules of Profession Conduct prohibits a lawyer
from obtaining an interest in a cause of action except an attorney lien or contingent fee.
An attorney lien involves the statutory right to recover unpaid fees from the proceeds of a
favorable judgment. See Idaho Code§ 3-205. The engagement agreement in this case does not
meet the requirements of a statutory lien.
A contingency fee agreement is defined and governed by Rule 1.5(c) of the Idaho Rules
of Professional Conduct. A contingency fee agreement involves a percentage that accrues to the
lawyer in the event of recovery. This Court has recognized one-third of the recovery as a
reasonable contingent fee. Parsons v. Mutual ofEnumclaw Ins. Co., 143 Idaho 743, 747-48, 152
P .3d 614, 618-19 (2007). In so holding, this Court affirmed, "An amount equal to standard
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contingent fees in the same locale is not an amount that is clearly erroneous." Id. (citing

Brinkman v. Aid Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 346, 351, 766 P.2d. 1227, 1232 (1988)).
The Bums Companies' engagement agreement is not a reasonable contingent fee. First, it
is a not a specified percentage of recovery. The amount claimed by the Bums Companies
exceeded the total recovery in the action. If expressed as a percentage, the fee claimed under the
engagement agreement would be greater than 100% of recovery. The Bums Companies did not
provide any evidence to establish that a contingent fee in excess of 100% was a standard fee in
the Teton County locale. A fee of such amount is unreasonable.
Although the district court may have referred to the engagement agreement as a
contingent fee, the payment provision is neither a lien nor a contingent fee as those terms are
used in the Idaho Rules of Profession Conduct. However, the engagement agreement does fit
within the proscriptions of Rule 1.8. The engagement agreement gives the law firm of Parsons
Behle and Latimer a financial interest in the outcome of the lawsuit. Because the agreement does
not fit within an exception under Rule 1.8 (lien or contingency), the claimed attorney fees should
be disallowed.

B. The interest rate on attorney fees is usurious.
This Court has frowned on excessive interests rates involving forbearance on an existing
debt. Rangen, Inc. v. Valley Trout Farms, Inc., 104 Idaho 284, 286, 658 P.2d 955, 957 (1983). In
the context of usury, forbearance is "a contractual obligation of lender or creditor to refrain,
during given period of time, from requiring borrower or debtor to replay loan or debt then due or
payable. Id. For the reasons discussed in the preceding section, the interest rate is excessive and
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unreasonable. It is further troubling because the rate arose in the negotiation to collect an existing
debt. According to Kirk Bums, Plaintiffs were unable to pay Parsons Behle and Latimer on a
timely basis. (K. Bums Deel. of Mar. 7, 2019 at 1 4.) The Bums Companies entered the
agreement two months after the conclusion of trial. (See id.) At that point, the Bums Companies
owed a substantial debt to their law firm. The law firm took advantage of its clients' precarious
position by demanding a usurious rate of interest masked as a modified contingent fee.

C. The interest rate should not be prospective.

Damages should be established at the time of trial, and interest from the date of judgment
should be set at the statutory rate. See Idaho Code § 28-22-104. In this case, the Bums
Companies not only attempt to seek interest at the claimed usurious rate from the date of trial to
the submission of attorney fees, the Bums Companies additionally sought an amendment to
award additional interest on monies that had become past due from the time of the initial fee
award. On December 17, 2019, the district court ordered an additional $16,254.50 in attorney
fees, bringing the total amount to $808,783.75. (Mem. Dec. of Dec. 17, 2019 at 6.) The Bums
Companies should not be able to continue to collect interest at the rate set forth in their
engagement agreement where post-judgment interest is limited by law under Idaho Code§ 2822-104.
V.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Teton County requests that this Court deny the claimed attorney
fees as unreasonable. In the alternative, Teton County requests that this Court deny the usurious
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interest on unpaid amounts. Finally, Teton County request that any interest at the rate set in the
engagement agreement be limited to those amounts past due at the commencement of trial.
Respectfully submitted on March 4, 2020.
OFFICE OF THE TETON COUNTY
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

/s/ Billie J. Siddoway
By: Billie J. Siddoway

Counsel for Teton County
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that date set forth below, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was caused to be filed electronically with automated service to:
Robert B. Bums
rbums@parsonsbehle.com
Parsons Behle & Latimer
800 West Main St Ste 1300
Boise, ID 83 702
Fax: 208-562-4901

Dated: March 4, 2020.

/s/ Billie Siddoway
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